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Paulo Bastos and Peter Wright 
Abstract 
We investigate the impact of exchange rate movements on wage determination in unionised 
labour markets. Using a simple model of international oligopoly, we show that organised labour 
has a rational incentive to accept lower wages in the face of a currency appreciation. This 
proposition is examined empirically using a matched worker-firm dataset for Portugal. We find 
results consistent with the predictions of the model, though the impact varies considerably with 
both worker characteristics and the regional unemployment rate. 
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There has been a long and passionate debate on the effect of collective bargaining institutions on wage 
flexibility. OECD (2004) reviews an extensive body of evidence and concludes that no robust associations 
emerge between several indicators of wage bargaining and either the growth rate of aggregate real wages 
or unemployment rates. Researchers and policymakers alike have therefore called for further micro-level 
analyses of the role of different collective bargaining arrangements in shaping wage adjustment to 
external shocks. Progress towards this aim has met with two important difficulties, however. First, in many 
countries sector-wide union agreements are supplemented with idiosyncratic adjustments at the level of 
the firm, and hence these two forms of wage adjustment need to be distinguished in the analysis. This 
requires detailed institutional information at the individual level, which is unavailable in most datasets. 
Second, the comparison of wage adjustments across micro-level studies requires identifying an important 
source of external shocks which can be plausibly regarded as exogenous to the wage setting process. 
 
This paper adds to the literature by examining the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on wage 
determination in the Portuguese manufacturing sector. For a number of reasons Portugal provides a 
remarkable case study in this context. First, it has a uniquely rich administrative worker-firm dataset which 
enables us to distinguish between sector-wide collective agreements and adjustments subsequently made 
at the level of the firm. Hence we are able to explicitly identify the response of collective bargaining 
outcomes to external shocks. Second, the labour market is characterized by both a high level of union 
coverage and a great degree of uniformity in the institutional arrangements for bargaining. Third, Portugal 
is a small open economy and hence fluctuations of import-weighted exchange rates constitute an 
important source of industry-specific external shocks to firms and workers. 
 
To guide the empirical analysis we develop a simple model of international oligopoly in which domestic 
workers are represented by an industry-level trade union. The main insight of this model is that an 
appreciation of the domestic currency, by increasing the elasticity of labour demand, and hence the trade-
off between wages and employment, leads the union to lower its wage demands. We then examine the 
predictions of the model for Portuguese manufacturing econometrically. The results confirm the predicted 
negative wage response to a currency appreciation and suggest that the bulk of it reflects adjustment in 
industry-wide bargained wages. The estimated real-wage elasticity to the real exchange rate is of similar 
magnitude to that obtained in previous studies for the U.S. manufacturing sector, where only a small 
fraction of workers are covered by union agreements. The results also reveal, however, that wage 
responses vary both with worker attributes and the local unemployment rate. 
 1 Introduction
There has been a long and heated debate on the e®ect of collective bargaining
institutions on wage °exibility. OECD (2004) reviews an extensive body of evi-
dence and concludes that no robust associations emerge between several indica-
tors of wage bargaining and either the growth rate of aggregate real wages or
unemployment rates. Researchers and policymakers alike have therefore called for
further micro-level analyses of the role of di®erent collective bargaining arrange-
ments in shaping wage adjustment to external shocks (OECD (2004), Blanchard
(2006), Freeman (2010)). Progress towards this aim has met with two impor-
tant di±culties, however. First, in many countries sector-wide union agreements
are supplemented with idiosyncratic adjustments at the level of the ¯rm, and
hence these two forms of wage adjustment need to be distinguished in the analysis
(Flanagan 1999). This requires detailed institutional information at the individ-
ual level, which is unavailable in most datasets. Second, the comparison of wage
adjustments across micro-level studies requires identifying an important source of
external shocks which can be plausibly regarded as exogenous to the wage setting
process.
This paper adds to the literature by examining the impact of exchange rate °uc-
tuations on unionised wages in the Portuguese manufacturing sector. For a number
of reasons Portugal provides a remarkable case study in this context. First, it has
a uniquely rich administrative worker-¯rm dataset which enables us to distinguish
between sector-wide collective agreements and adjustments subsequently made at
the level of the ¯rm (Cardoso and Portugal 2005). Hence we are able to explicitly
identify the response of collective bargaining outcomes to external shocks. Second,
the labour market is characterized by both a high level of union coverage and a
great degree of uniformity in the institutional arrangements for bargaining. Third,
Portugal is a small open economy and hence °uctuations of import-weighted ex-
change rates constitute an important source of industry-speci¯c external shocks to
¯rms and workers.
To guide the empirical analysis, we develop a simple model of international
oligopoly in which domestic workers are represented by an industry-level trade
union. The main insight of this model is that an appreciation of the domestic
currency, by increasing the elasticity of labour demand, and hence the trade-o®
between wages and employment, leads the union to lower its wage demands. We
then examine the predictions of the model for Portuguese manufacturing econo-
metrically. The results con¯rm the predicted negative wage response to a currency
appreciation and suggest that the bulk of it re°ects adjustment in industry-wide
bargained wages. They also reveal, however, that wage responses vary both with
worker characteristics and the local unemployment rate.
A number of previous studies have examined the response of actual paid wages
1to exchange rate °uctuations in the US manufacturing sector, where only a small
fraction of workers are covered by union agreements. Revenga (1992) instruments
import penetration with source-weighted real exchange rates in a study that ex-
amines the impact of increased import competition on wages. She ¯nds a negative
impact of increased international competition, though one that is relatively small
in magnitude. Bertrand (2004) employs a similar instrumental variable strategy
using a panel of US workers and ¯nds that, besides lowering average wages, in-
creased foreign competition also increases the sensitivity of wages to the local
unemployment rate. Campa and Goldberg (2001), using industry-level data for
the US, explicitly focus on the e®ect of real exchange rate °uctuations on wages.
Their estimates point to a wage elasticity with respect to the real exchange rate
of 0.06, in line with the estimates of Revenga (1992). As we will see below, our
estimates point to an elasticity of actual paid wages of fairly similar magnitude.
2 Exchange rates and union wage demands
Although the theoretical literature examining the impact of globalisation on unionised
labour markets has grown steadily in recent years1, an examination of the impact of
exchange rate °uctuations on unionised wages is absent. Below we develop a sim-
ple model of unionised international oligopoly which allows us to study the e®ect
of exchange rate °uctuations on the wage demands of industry-level trade unions,
in order to provide a framework for the empirical analysis that follows. The model
builds on Dornbusch (1987), who analyses the e®ect of exchange rate movements
on key industry variables in an international oligopoly model. The innovation we
introduce is that home wages are set by a monopoly union model rather than being
exogenously given. This approach to wage setting has been popular in papers ex-
amining the implications of other aspects of globalisation (e.g. Naylor(1998, 1999)
and Lommerud, Meland and S¿rgard (2003)).
2.1 Model setup
2.1.1 Product Market
We consider a two-country, single industry model with n identical domestic sup-
pliers and n¤ identical foreign ¯rms. For simplicity, we assume that domestic and
foreign ¯rms sell all their output in the home country2, where product demand is
1inter alia Brander and Spencer (1988), Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991), Huizinga (1993),
Piperakis, Hine and Wright (2003), Straume (2003), Lommerud, Meland and Straume (2006),
Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) and Bastos, Kreickemeier and Wright (2009).
2The model could readily be extended to allow the ¯rms to sell in both markets, as for instance
in Brander (1981). This would add complexity without changing any of its qualitative results.
2described by the following linear function:
p = a ¡ bQ = a ¡ b(nq + n
¤q
¤) (1)
Where, a;b > 0, p is the home product price expressed in local currency, and Q
denotes total sales by home (q) and foreign ¯rms (q¤). The exchange rate ("),
is de¯ned as the number of units of foreign currency that are needed to buy one
unit of the home currency. Domestic suppliers face receive p, whilst foreign ¯rms
receive "p per unit of commodity sold.
The ¯rms produce an homogeneous commodity under constant returns to scale,
with labour as the only input and output per worker normalized to unity. Hence
the pro¯t function of the representative ¯rm in each country is given by:
¼ = [p ¡ w]q (2)
¼
¤ = ["p ¡ w
¤]q
¤ (3)
We will further assume that Cournot competition characterises the product mar-
ket.
2.1.2 Labour market
In the labour market, there is a single trade union representing all workers em-
ployed by the domestic suppliers. The union cares about both wages and employ-
ment, which we capture using the following utility function:
U = (w ¡ w)nq (4)
Where, w is the wage rate and w is the wage that a union worker can earn in the
non-union sector. To determine the bargained wage level, we adopt a formulation
in which the monopoly union sets the wage and the ¯rms subsequently have the
right to manage in setting employment at the pro¯t maximising level. Foreign
¯rms recruit workers from a competitive labour market at the wage rate w¤, which
is expressed in units of the foreign currency.
2.1.3 Solving the model
The model is solved as a two-stage game: in stage one, the union makes its wage
demand, taking the exchange rate and the wage of the foreign competitor as given;
in stage two, each ¯rm chooses its pro¯t maximising level of employment and
output, taking as given the wage set by the union in the previous period. We solve
for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium by backwards induction.
3Product market equilibrium
Assuming that competition in the product market is Cournot, then solving the ¯rst
order conditions for pro¯t maximization, yields the following best-reply functions















1 + n¤q (6)
Solving (5) and (6) gives equilibrium sales of:
q =
a ¡ (1 + n¤)w + n¤(w¤=")




a + nw ¡ (1 + n)(w¤=")
b(1 + n + n¤)
(8)
Union wage setting
The monopoly union will maximize (4) subject to (7). This gives the equilibrium








A number of things are worthy of note. Firstly, one can see from (9) that
union wage demands are positively associated with the reservation income of union
workers, as would be expected. Secondly, the wage demands of the monopoly union
will be a®ected by the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the wage rate.
The more elastic is labour demand, the higher the trade o® the union will face
between wages and employment, and the lower the wage that will be set. Thirdly,
an appreciation in the exchange rate will lead to the union setting lower wages.
This is because a rise in " will make home ¯rms less competitive with respect
to their foreign rivals, and this will increase the elasticity of labour demand with
respect to the wage rate. The home union therefore faces a higher trade o® between
wages and employment, and so has an incentive to set a lower wage rate. This
result will be the main focus of the empirical analysis that follows.
43 Collective bargaining in Portugal
Portugal provides an interesting case for studying the impact of exchange rate
movements on collectively bargained outcomes, ¯rstly because of the high level
of coverage and secondly because of the uniformity of institutional arrangements.
The primary level of bargaining in Portugal is at the sectoral level3, with the
agreements published in legal documents, normally between January and April.
These agreements typically establish the minimum working conditions for each
category or group of workers, including the monthly base wage, the overtime pay
and the normal hours of work. The wage clauses are ordinarily updated yearly
and are valid, often retrospectively, for the whole of the calendar year.
A worker will be covered by a collective agreement if they are a±liated with a
trade union that has signed an agreement with their employer or with the corre-
sponding employers' association. However, voluntary extensions are widespread,
whereby workers' or employers' associations voluntarily subscribe to an agreement
to which they were not original signatories. For these reasons, most workers in
Portuguese manufacturing are covered by some type of collective agreement, irre-
spective of their union membership status.4
A further interesting feature of the Portuguese industrial relations system is
that, although sectoral agreements are not ordinarily supplemented by further
local collective bargaining, a signi¯cant proportion of workers actually receive
wages above the level that is set via the collective bargaining process (Cardoso
and Portugal 2005). This occurs when ¯rms adjust wages upwards to re°ect their
speci¯c conditions, generating a wage cushion. This feature will allow us to ex-
amine how exchange rate °uctuations impact not just on the contractual wage,
but also on the wage cushion and the actual wage paid. The existence of such
¯rm-speci¯c mark-ups on top of wage °oors set via more centralised bargaining is
a feature of other European countries. See Flanagan (1999) for a survey.
4 Data
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on the Quadros de Pessoal (QP).
This is a compulsory, annual, administrative census collected by the Portuguese
Ministry of Employment, which covers all ¯rms with employees in manufacturing
and services. It contains unique, time-invariant identi¯ers which allow workers to
3In contrast to some other OECD countries, ¯rm-level bargaining covers only a small propor-
tion of workers in the private sector and is virtually non-existent in manufacturing (Cardoso and
Portugal 2005).
4For a more detailed description of the institutional setting of collective bargaining in Portugal
see Cardoso and Portugal (2005).
5be matched to their employers and to be tracked over time. Since the data is used
by the Ministry of Employment for checking compliance with labour law, stress is
placed on the reliability of the information supplied by the employers. Portuguese
law also makes it compulsory for ¯rms to display this information publicly in the
establishment. We restrict our analysis to full-time wage earners, aged between 16
and 65, who work at least 25 hours a week in a ¯rm located in mainland Portu-
gal. Firm-level information includes sales, number of employees, equity, industry
code, geographical location and date of establishment. Information on workers
includes base wage and other components of pay, gender, schooling, start date of
employment, occupation and hours worked. The data also includes identi¯ers for
the collective bargaining agreement covering the worker, as well as an indication
of whether the contract is ¯rm, multi-¯rm, or sector speci¯c.5
Since our primary motivation is to investigate the e®ect of movements in ", we
supplement the information from the QP with source-weighted, industry-speci¯c,
real exchange rates for the years 1991 to 2000. The data is classi¯ed according
to the Portuguese classi¯cation of economic activities (CAE) into 74 industries.6
Finally, and as is standard in the literature (e.g. Card (1995), Bertrand (2004)),
we use the regional unemployment rate as an inverse proxy for w, the fall back
position of the union workers in the bargain.7
Table 1 presents summary statistics from the QP for the main variables used in
the analysis over the 1991-2000 period. The average wage cushion in Portuguese
manufacturing over this period was 0.19 log points. This con¯rms the importance
of ¯rm-speci¯c arrangements in addition to industry-level collective bargaining.
The table also illustrates the high proportion of females (47 percent) and the low
general level of education (5.65 years) in the workforce.
Figure 1 shows the movements in the exchange rate of the Portuguese Escudo
against the currencies of a number of major trading partners from 1990 to 2000.
As can be seen, real exchange rate movements exhibit substantial heterogeneity
across trading partners. The cross-industry variation in the relative importance of
each partner in each industries trade is re°ected in the variation in the industry
real exchange rate from 1990 to 2000 (Figure 2). Such heterogeneity will be critical
for identifying the wage e®ects of real exchange rate movements in the econometric
analysis that follows.
5For further information on the dataset and details on sample selection, please see the data
appendix.
6For previous use of comparable measures see for example Revenga (1992), Gourinchas (1999),
Campa and Goldberg (2001), Bertrand (2004) and Cu~ nat and Guadalupe (2009).
7This data is classi¯ed by NUTS-II regions, which divides mainland Portugal into: North,
Centre, Lisbon and Vale do Tejo, Alentejo and the Algarve.
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5 Econometric speci¯cation and results
To investigate the impact of exchange rate °uctuations on wage determination, we
use the following baseline speci¯cation:
lnwit = ®:xit + ¯:yjt + °:zat + ±:lnexchk(t¡1) + ´:unempr(t¡1) (10)
+ Ái + µj + ¸k + Ãr + ½t + ¹it
where: wit is the wage for worker i in year t; xit is a vector of individual charac-
teristics; yjt is a vector of characteristics for ¯rm j at which worker i is employed
in year t; zat is a vector of characteristics of the collective agreement a that covers
worker i in year t; Ái is a person ¯xed e®ect; µj is a ¯rm ¯xed e®ect; ¸k an industry
¯xed e®ect; Ãr is a region ¯xed e®ect; ½t is a time period ¯xed e®ect; and ¹it is an
exogenous disturbance. In order to obviate from possible simultaneity problems,
we lag the source-weighted real exchange rate index of industry k (exchk(t¡1)) and
the unemployment rate in the region (unempr(t¡1)).
As the dependent variable, we consider in turn the contractual wage, the wage
cushion and actual wage. In order to split the actual wage into the contractual
wage and the wage cushion, we follow the methodology of Cardoso and Portugal















1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
year
Preparing/preserving meat Canning/preserving Fish
Canning/preserving fruit/veg Dairy products
Beverages Tobacco

















1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
year
Wood/wood products Pulp paper/paper products
Basic industrial chemicals Glass/glass products
Machinery/domestic appliances Electrical material
Watches/clocks Electronic material
8(2005). They argue that the mode of the distribution of the base wage for each job
category, within each collective agreement, corresponds with remarkable accuracy
to the contractual wage that is set through collective bargaining.8 The wage
cushion is then de¯ned as the ratio of overall monthly earnings actually received
by the individual (including the base wage, tenure-related and other regularly paid
components) to the contractual wage for the worker's professional category in the
collective agreement that covers the worker.9
The vector of worker attributes includes age, age squared, gender, years of
schooling and tenure. The 1988 International Standard Classi¯cation of Occu-
pations (ISCO-88) allows us to de¯ne four skilled levels, based on the level of
general education and the job-related formal training required to perform a job
(International Labour O±ce 1990).
The vector of ¯rm characteristics includes ¯rm size (number of employees),
age since establishment, labour productivity (ratio of ¯rm sales to the number of
employees), capital intensity (equity relative to number of employees), and market
share (¯rm sales relative to total industry sales). The vector of agreement charac-
teristics includes the number of workers and the number of regions covered by the
collective agreement.
Table 2 reports the baseline results for the contractual wage, the wage cushion
and the actual wage. In all cases results are presented when worker ¯xed e®ects
and worker-¯rm (spell) ¯xed e®ects are included, with the results being largely
comparable across the two speci¯cations. The table reports standard errors clus-
tered at the individual level to allow for correlation across time. For comparison we
also present standard errors clustered at the industry-year level in square brackets.
The results show consistent impacts of worker attributes on the actual level of
wages. Older workers, those with higher education and those in higher skill groups
earn more. The characteristics of the ¯rm are also important: those in larger and
more productive ¯rms earn more than otherwise, and gain an additional premium
if their ¯rm has a larger market share. Workers also appear to be able to obtain
higher wages if the number of workers covered by the collective agreement is higher.
Turning to the components of the actual wage, in general the results con¯rm
the earlier cross sectional evidence of Cardoso and Portugal (2005) that the wage
cushion magni¯es the returns to personal and workplace characteristics. Older,
more educated workers in larger, more productive ¯rms have both higher contrac-
8To support this claim, they examine the relationship between the contractual wage for each
worker category, obtained directly from published collective agreements, and the corresponding
modal base wage in some pre-selected industries.
9Only categories consisting of at least 50 workers and agreements with at least 1,000 workers
were included in the analysis. The ¯nal panel comprises information on 938,060 workers, 54,481
¯rms and 168 sectoral agreements for the years 1991 to 2000. This amounts to about 3.6 million
worker-year observations.
9tual wages and higher wage cushions.
The impact of agreement size and the geographical coverage of the agreement
has opposite e®ects on the contractual wage and the wage cushion. Again this is
similar to the ¯ndings of Cardoso and Portugal (2005), who argue that this re°ects
the fact that ¯rms use the wage cushion to partly undo the impact of collective
bargaining on wage setting.
As might be expected, actual wages paid are negatively associated with the
regional unemployment rate, a result that is standard elsewhere in the literature.
Interestingly, however, our results suggest that this result is largely driven by the
negative response of contractual wages, which o®sets a small positive response of
the wage cushion as some ¯rms seek some °exibility in their wage policy, despite
poor economic conditions.
Turning to the primary focus of this paper, we see that a higher real exchange
rate leads to a statistically signi¯cant fall in actual wages, as predicted by the theo-
retical framework presented earlier. Speci¯cally, the estimates point to an average
real wage elasticity with respect to the exchange rate of about 0.07. This is very
much in line with the estimated elasticity obtained by Campa and Goldberg (2001)
for US manufacturing (0.06). Interestingly, although the impact of the exchange
rate emerges via both a change in the contractual wage and the wage cushion, the
majority of the adjustment is via the former. This conforms with the theoretical
prediction of the earlier model, although it suggests that some of the adjustment
is made idiosyncratically by ¯rms via the wage cushion. Further, notice that the
magnitude of the e®ects remains very similar when spell ¯xed-e®ects models are
used to simultaneously control for worker and ¯rm unobserved heterogeneity. The
results suggest that, overall, strong union presence is not necessarily associated
with lower wage °exibility.
Heterogeneity of e®ects
We investigate further the impact of the real exchange rate on wages by aug-
menting the baseline model in a number of ways. Firstly, in Table 3, the impact
of regional in°uences is examined by interacting the exchange rate with the re-
gional unemployment rate. This shows that the sensitivity of wages to higher
regional unemployment decreases following a real currency appreciation, a result
that contrasts with related estimates obtained by Bertrand (2004) for the US
labour market. This might be explained by the stricter employment protection
for tenured workers in Portugal, who are more likely to remain employed and less
likely to su®er downward pressure on their wages when the local labour market is
depressed.
Secondly, Guadalupe (2007) for the US and Falvey, Greenaway and Silva (2008)
for Portugal ¯nd that harsher international competition (as measured by a real
10currency appreciation) leads to higher returns to skill. We investigate this propo-
sition in Tables 4 and 5 by interacting the exchange rate with our measure of job
tenure. We ¯nd that the negative wage impact of appreciation is higher for those
with tenure of less than one year and for those with low levels of schooling. Perhaps
more importantly, in both of these cases, the negative relationship is exclusively
driven by adjustments in the wage cushion, which o®set contrary movements in
contractual wages. This ¯nding is consistent with the theoretical explanation pro-
posed by Guadalupe (2007), who emphasizes the role of ¯rm-speci¯c incentives
and market forces, as opposed to collective bargaining, in determining the causal
e®ect of international competition on returns to skill.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the e®ect of real exchange rate °uctuations on
unionised wages. Using uniquely rich worker-¯rm panel data for the Portuguese
manufacturing sector, we were able to distinguish between changes in industry-
wide collective wages and subsequent adjustments at the level of the ¯rm. Our
estimates point to an average real wage elasticity with respect to real exchange
rate changes of about 0.07, most of which re°ects adjustments in industry-level
collective wages. Our results reveal however that wage responses vary considerably
by worker characteristics. Speci¯cally, the negative wage e®ects of exchange rate
appreciations tend to be felt by newcomers to the ¯rm and the low skilled. Finally,
we have ¯nd that a currency appreciation tends to decrease the sensitivity of wages
to the local unemployment rate, a result that contrasts with related estimates
obtained by Bertrand (2004) for the US labour market.
11Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Actual wage (ln) 11.51 0.31
Contractual wage (ln) 11.31 0.31
Wage cushion 0.19 0.31
Age 35.53 11.00
Male 0.53 0.50
Schooling (years) 5.65 2.88
Tenure 9.54 8.90
Tenure < 1 year 0.08 0.28
Firm size 4.60 1.60
Firm age 23.20 20.60
Firm average labour productivity (ln) 8.78 1.11
Firm capital intensity 2688.84 72599.37
Market share 0.02 0.08
No. of workers in agreement (ln) 10.74 1.15
No. of districts in agreement 24.68 5.54
Employment rate (ln) 4.85 0.11





12Table 2: Wage e®ects of real exchange rate movements: baseline model
Contractual wage Wage cushion Actual wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age 0.0109 0.0096 0.0130 0.0070 0.0239 0.0166
(0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0003)** (0.0003)** (0.0002)** (0.0003)**
[0.0014]** [0.0013]** [0.0010]** [0.0009]** [0.0017]** [0.0015]**
age squared -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
[0.0000]** [0.0000]** [0.0000]** [0.0000]** [0.0000]** [0.0000]**
schooling 0.0028 0.0019 0.0054 0.0046 0.0082 0.0065
(0.0003)** (0.0003)** (0.0004)** (0.0004)** (0.0003)** (0.0003)**
[0.0003]** [0.0004]** [0.0004]** [0.0005]** [0.0004]** [0.0005]**
tenure 0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0016 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0005
(0.0000)** (0.0002)** (0.0001)** (0.0002) (0.0001)* (0.0002)**
[0.0001]** [0.0003]** [0.0002]** [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002]*
tenure < 1 year -0.0057 -0.0073 -0.0044 -0.0116 -0.0101 -0.0189
(0.0005)** (0.0005)** (0.0007)** (0.0008)** (0.0006)** (0.0006)**
[0.0013]** [0.0015]** [0.0014]** [0.0016]** [0.0013]** [0.0016]**
¯rst skill group -0.1810 -0.1803 0.0372 0.0720 -0.1437 -0.1083
(0.0055)** (0.0058)** (0.0064)** (0.0066)** (0.0034)** (0.0032)**
[0.0129]** [0.0132]** [0.0135]** [0.0135]** [0.0056]** [0.0050]**
second skill group -0.0867 -0.0896 -0.0174 0.0145 -0.1041 -0.0751
(0.0055)** (0.0058)** (0.0064)** (0.0066)* (0.0034)** (0.0032)**
[0.0112]** [0.0118]** [0.0124] [0.0123] [0.0052]** [0.0046]**
third skill group 0.0413 0.0273 -0.0975 -0.0663 -0.0562 -0.0390
(0.0055)** (0.0057)** (0.0064)** (0.0065)** (0.0032)** (0.0031)**
[0.0122]** [0.0123]* [0.0128]** [0.0127]** [0.0042]** [0.0040]**
¯rm size 0.0102 0.0110 0.0223 0.0270 0.0326 0.0380
(0.0003)** (0.0006)** (0.0004)** (0.0008)** (0.0004)** (0.0006)**
[0.0008]** [0.0018]** [0.0012]** [0.0028]** [0.0013]** [0.0026]**
¯rm age -0.0003 0.0051 0.0002 0.0100 -0.0001 0.0152
(0.0000)** (0.0002)** (0.0000)** (0.0004)** (0.0000)* (0.0003)**
[0.0001]** [0.0012]** [0.0001] [0.0012]** [0.0001] [0.0011]**
¯rm labour productivity (ln) 0.0010 0.0007 0.0042 0.0034 0.0052 0.0041
(0.0010)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0002)**
[0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0008]** [0.0009]** [0.0010]** [0.0041]**
¯rm capital intensity 0.0039 0.0022 -0.0105 -0.0102 -0.0067 -0.0080
(0.0015)* (0.0014) (0.0022)** (0.0022)** (0.0014) (0.0014)
[0.0031] [0.0024] [0.0055] [0.0051]* [0.0037] [0.0038]
¯rm market share 0.0554 0.0166 -0.0326 -0.0062 0.0229 0.0105
(0.0050)** (0.0050)** (0.0065)** (0.0062)** (0.0048)** (0.0050)*
[0.0212]** [0.0280] [0.0303] [0.0380] [0.0262] [0.0306]
no. workers in agreement (ln) -0.0152 -0.0152 0.0174 0.0221 0.0021 0.0070
(0.0007)** (0.0008)** (0.0008)** (0.0009)** (0.0005)** (0.0005)**
[0.0043]** [0.0051]** [0.0035]** [0.0044]** [0.0020] [0.0023]**
no. districts agreement -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0001)** (1.09) (0.0001)* (0.0001)*
[0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005]
regional unemp. rate -0.0080 -0.0083 0.0023 0.0020 -0.0057 -0.0063
(0.0002)** (0.0002)** (0.0003)** (0.0003)** (0.0003)** (0.0003)**
[0.0012]** [0.0013]** [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0014]** [0.0013]**
exchange rate (ln) -0.0487 -0.0501 -0.0169 -0.0165 -0.0657 -0.0667
(0.0035)** (0.0035)** (0.0055)** (0.0055)** (0.0045)** (0.0045)**
[0.0369] [0.0365] [0.0326] [0.0333] [0.0283]* [0.0282]*
worker ¯xed-e®ects yes yes yes
spell ¯xed-e®ects yes yes yes
R-squared 0.48 0.15 0.05 0.02 0.37 0.09
Observations 3,654,006 3,654,006 3,654,006
a. Robust standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered by
industry-year in square brackets.
b. ** Signi¯cant at 1%. * Signi¯cant at 5%.
c. The period of analysis is 1991-2000. Year and industry dummies included.
13Table 3: Wage e®ects of real exchange rate movements: regional in°uences
Contractual wage Wage cushion Actual wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exchange rate (ln) -0.1344 -0.1384 -0.0971 -0.0968 -0.2315 -0.2352
(0.0050)** (0.0051)** (0.0075)** (0.0076)** (0.0061)** (0.0061)**
[0.0516]** [0.0511]** [0.0353]** [0.0363]** [0.041]** [0.0415]**
regional unemp. rate -0.0847 -0.0872 -0.0696 -0.0697 -0.1543 -0.1568
(0.0033)** (0.0033)** (0.0048)** (0.0049)** (0.0038)** (0.0038)**
[0.0210]** [0.0211]** [0.0159]** [0.0169]** [0.0213]** [0.0215]**
exchange rate (ln) * reg. unemp. rate 0.0160 0.0164 0.0150 0.0149 0.0309 0.0313
(0.0007)** (0.0007)** (0.0010)** (0.0010)** (0.0008)** (0.0008)**
[0.0043]** [0.0043]** [0.0033]** [0.0035]** [0.0043]** [0.0044]**
worker ¯xed e®ects yes yes yes
spell ¯xed-e®ects yes yes yes
R-squared 0.48 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.37 0.08
Observations 3,654,006 3,654,006 3,654,006
a. Robust standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered by industry-
year in square brackets.
b. ** Signi¯cant at 1%. * Signi¯cant at 5%.
c. The period of analysis is 1991-2000. Year and industry dummies included.
Table 4: Wage e®ects of real exchange rate movements: the role of tenure
Contractual wage Wage cushion Actual wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tenure -0.0006 -0.0021 0.0007 0.0026 0.0001 0.0006
(0.0006)** (0.0006)** (0.0009) (0.0010)** (0.0008) (0.0008)
[0.0044] [0.0045] [0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0044] [0.0041]
tenure < 1 year -0.3671 -0.1789 0.4485 0.3525 0.0814 0.1736
(0.0169)** (0.0182)** (0.0027)** (0.0298)** (0.0231)** (0.0250)**
[0.0759]** [0.0634]** [0.0499]** [0.0492]** [0.0641] [0.1736]**
exchange rate (ln) -0.0576 -0.0552 -0.0063 -0.0064 -0.0639 -0.0616
(0.0038)** (0.0039)** (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0048)** (0.0049)**
[0.0417] [0.0412] [0.0339] [0.0346] [0.0324] [0.0316]
exchange rate (ln) * tenure 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0001)** (0.0001)* (0.0002)* (0.0002)* (0.0002) (0.0002)
[0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0008]
exchange rate (ln) * tenure < 1 year 0.0746 0.0354 -0.0935 -0.0751 -0.0189 -0.0397
(0.0035)** (0.0038)** (0.0056)** (0.0061)** (0.0048)** (0.0051)**
[0.0156]** [0.0130]** [0.0103]** [0.0102]** [0.0132] [0.0110]**
worker ¯xed-e®ects yes yes yes
spell ¯xed-e®ects yes yes yes
R-squared 0.47 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.37 0.09
Observations 3,654,006 3,654,006 3,654,006
a. Robust standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered by industry-
year in square brackets.
b. ** Signi¯cant at 1%. * Signi¯cant at 5%.
c. The period of analysis is 1991-2000. Year and industry dummies included.
14Table 5: Wage e®ects of real exchange rate movements: the role of schooling
Contractual wage Wage cushion Actual wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
schooling 0.0425 0.0399 -0.1697 -0.1664 -0.1272 -0.1266
(0.0036)** (0.0036)** (0.0044)** (0.0044)** (0.0027)** (0.0027)**
[0.0141]** [0.0140]** [0.0143]** [0.0147]** [0.0092]** [0.0092]**
exchange rate (ln) -0.0069 -0.0101 -0.2014 -0.1968 -0.2083 -0.2069
(0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0070)** (0.0070)** (0.0053)** (0.0053)**
[0.0394] [0.03837] [0.0321]** [0.0331]** [0.0305]** [0.0303]**
exchange rate (ln) * schooling -0.0082 -0.0078 0.0361 0.0352 0.0279 0.0274
(0.0007)** (0.0007)** (0.0003)** (0.0009)** (0.0006)** (0.0006)**
[0.0029]** [0.0029]** [0.0030]** [0.0031]** [0.0019]** [0.0019]**
worker ¯xed-e®ects yes yes yes
spell ¯xed-e®ects yes yes yes
R-squared 0.48 0.15 0.05 0.02 0.37 0.09
Observations 3,654,006 3,654,006 3,654,006
a. Robust standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered by industry-
year in square brackets.
b. ** Signi¯cant at 1%. * Signi¯cant at 5%.
c. The period of analysis is 1991-2000. Year and industry dummies included.
15Data Appendix
Longitudinal linked employer-employee dataset
The primary source of data in the paper is the Quadros de Pessoal (QP). Our
sample consists of full time workers in manufacturing, aged between 16 and 65 years
old, earning at least the national minimum wage. Records with inconsistencies in
worker gender, date of birth and the highest level of schooling are removed.10
Because we compute the contractual wage as the mode of the distribution of
base wages for each job category within each collective agreement for each year
(as in Cardoso and Portugal (2005)), we only keep job categories with at least 50
workers and agreements with at least 1,000 workers. The ¯nal worker-¯rm panel
contains information on 938,060 workers, 54,481 ¯rms and 168 sectoral agreements
for the years 1991 to 2000, yielding a total of 3,654,006 observations.
Exchange rate data
The real exchange rates are the product of the nominal exchange rates (expressed
in units of foreign currency per unit of local currency) and the ratio between the
Portuguese Consumer Price Index (CPI) and foreign CPI. The weights used are
the shares of each trade partner in Portuguese imports in 1990-1991. For each
industry, we have normalised the real exchange rate index to 100 in 1990. The
nominal exchange rates and CPI come from the International Financial Statistics
of the International Monetary Fund.
Industry level data
The Industry-level data is classi¯ed according to the Portuguese classi¯cation of
economic activities (CAE). However, since the CAE classi¯cation was revised in
1994, the resulting dataset comprises 74 industries. Of the 99 manufacturing
industries in CAE-Rev. 1, 56 had direct equivalents in CAE-Rev.2. The remaining
46 industries were aggregated into 18 sectors to provide an equivalence. The
concordance used is available from the authors on request.
De¯nition of skill groups
Amongst the vector of individual attributes we include a group of dummy variables
to control for the skill level associated with the worker's occupation, as de¯ned in
10Details of procedures used to correct inconsistencies follow Cardoso (2006), and are available
from the authors on request.
16Table A.1: The ISCO classi¯cation system
Occupational Group % of total Description ISCO Major group
First skill level 16.66 Competence associated with general education (9) Elementary occupations
usually acquired by completion of compulsory
education.
Second skill level 76.41 Requires knowledge as for ¯rst skill level, but in (4) Clerks
addition typically have a longer period of worker- (5) Service workers and shop
related training or work experience. and market sales
(6) Skilled agriculture and
¯shery
(7) Craft and related workers
(8) Plant and machine
operators and assemblers
Third skill level 4.89 Requires a body of knowledge associated with a (3) Technicians and associate
period of post-compulsory education but not to professionals
degree level.
Fourth skill level 2.05 Normally requires a degree or an equivalent period (1) Legislators, senior o±cials
of relevant work experience. and managers
(2) Professionals
Observations 3,664,006
Source: International Labour O±ce (1990, pp.23) and Elias, McKnight and Kingshott (1999).
the ISCO-88 classi¯cation. Table A.1 presents the de¯nition of skill groups and
sample proportions.
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